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Citizens Not United: The Lack of Stockholder 
Voluntariness in Corporate Political Speech 
 
With the Supreme Court hearing a new round of oral arguments in Citizens 
United v. Federal Election Commission,1 the Court appears poised to alter 
dramatically the landscape of corporate political speech law. The case concerns 
whether the government may limit a nonprofit political advocacy group from 
showing a film during election season when the film casts an electoral 
candidate in a negative light and is financed in part by corporate donations. In 
the first round of argument, Citizens United narrowly argued that the 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 20022 could not constitutionally be applied 
to its feature-length, video-on-demand film, which it argued did not contain 
express advocacy and was funded primarily by individual donations rather 
than general corporate expenditures. Unexpectedly, at the end of last Term, the 
Court asked the parties to address in re-argument whether it should overrule 
two key precedents upholding restrictions on corporate political spending from 
general funds: Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce3 and part of McConnell 
v. FEC.4 
In reconsidering these precedents the Court should modernize its analysis 
of an important concern expressed for over a century in this context: that when 
corporations are allowed to spend general funds on electoral advocacy, 
stockholders may have money they invested in a corporation used for political 
advocacy they oppose. Dramatic changes in the amount and types of U.S. 
 
1.  129 S. Ct. 2893 (2009).
 
2.  Pub. L. No. 107-155, 116 Stat. 81 (2002).
 
3.  494 U.S. 652 (1990) (holding that corporations may be prohibited from spending general 
funds on electoral advocacy). 
4.  540 U.S. 93 (2003) (upholding the facial validity of a provision of the Bipartisan Campaign 
Reform Act prohibiting corporations from using their general funds to pay for certain 
“electioneering communications”). 
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stockholding have occurred in the past several decades that should heighten 
this concern, making it more compelling than ever, particularly in combination 
with the related concern about the corruptive influence of corporate money in 
politics. Overruling Austin and McConnell could clear the way for the nation’s 
largest for-profit corporations to electioneer with general treasuries amassed 
from investors who did not intend the money be used for political purposes 
and who will not likely obtain relief. 
i .  origins of the concern about stockholder 
voluntariness in corporate political speech 
The concern about stockholder voluntariness in corporate political speech5 
dates back to the early 1900s and a scandal involving life insurance company 
executives who used corporate funds for self-serving political contributions.6 
The public was outraged that company executives would use other people’s 
money for their own personal gain or to suit their own personal political tastes, 
exploiting stockholders who did not wish to make a political statement with 
their financial investments. Although stockholders are generally not involved 
in corporate decisionmaking, they entrust directors as fiduciaries to manage the 
corporation, which in the for-profit business context is often characterized as 
for the purpose of maximizing firm value.7 In response to the public call for 
corporate spending reform, President Theodore Roosevelt told Congress: “All 
contributions by corporations to any political committee or for any political 
purpose should be forbidden by law; directors should not be permitted to use 
stockholders’ money for such purposes . . . .”8 Subsequently, Congress passed 
the Tillman Act of 1907,9 which banned corporations from spending money “in 
connection with” any federal election.10 The concern about corporate political 
 
5.  Because the Court does not appear to be reconsidering underlying premises such as whether 
corporations should be treated as “persons” with constitutional rights, or whether the 
spending of money on elections is “political speech,” this Essay uses such terminology 
without commenting on its merit. 
6.  See Adam Winkler, “Other People’s Money”: Corporations, Agency Costs, and Campaign Finance 
Law, 92 GEO. L.J. 871, 887-96 (2004). 
7.  ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 21-24, 93-140, 675-703 (1986). 
8.  United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 572 (1957)(quoting 40 CONG. REC. 96 (1905)); see 
also McConnell, 540 U.S. at 115 (same). 
9.  Pub. L. No. 59-36, 34 Stat. 864 (1907). 
10.  See McConnell, 540 U.S. at 115. 
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spending without stockholder consent has continued to find a voice through a 
century of case law.11 
At times, however, the Court has given little weight to this concern. In First 
National Bank v. Bellotti,12 the Court reasoned that the concern was not critical 
because a stockholder “is free to withdraw his investment at any time and for 
any reason.”13 Further, the Court noted that stockholders “may decide, through 
the procedures of corporate democracy, whether their corporation should 
engage in debate on public issues,” and “generally have access to the judicial 
remedy of a derivative suit to challenge corporate disbursements . . . .”14 
Whatever the strength of these assertions in 1978 when the Court decided 
Bellotti, significant changes in investment patterns in the intervening decades 
undercut their validity today. 
i i .  stock ownership in the united states 
Changes in U.S. stockholding patterns and demographics in the past 
several decades have been dramatic. Whereas in the early 1980s less than one-
fifth of American households owned stock, today nearly half of American 
households own stock.15 This explosion in numbers has brought increasing 
diversity to the composition of American stock owners.16 They have stock 
ownership in common but are otherwise heterogeneous across multiple 
demographic categories and almost certainly across the political spectrum. 
Thus, a near majority of Americans now stands to have their investments used 
by corporations for electoral speech they may oppose. 
 
11.  See, e.g., FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 154 (2003); Austin v. Mich. Chamber of 
Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 675 (1990) (Brennan, J., concurring); FEC v. Mass. Citizens for 
Life, 479 U.S. 238, 257-58 (1986); FEC v. Nat’l Right To Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207-
08 (1982); Pipefitters Local Union No. 562 v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972); United 
States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567 (1957); United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948). 
12.  435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
13.   Id. at 794 & n.34. 
14.  Id. at 794-95. 
15.  See INV. CO. INST. & SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, EQUITY OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA, 2005, at 1, available 
at http://www.sifma.org/research/pdf/EquityOwnership05.pdf; see also INV. CO. INST. & 
SEC. INDUS. & FIN. MKTS. ASS’N, EQUITY AND BOND OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA, 2008, at 7, 
available at http://www.ici.org/pdf/rpt_08_equity_owners.pdf. 
16.  See JOINT ECON. COMM., THE ROOTS OF BROADENED STOCK OWNERSHIP (2000) (citing data 
from the Federal Reserve Board’s Survey of Consumer Finances). 
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Moreover, a large amount of U.S. household stock ownership is indirect—
through mutual funds, 401(k) accounts, or other pension or retirement plans.17 
Indeed, ninety percent of equity-owning U.S. households own stock in mutual 
funds.18 This translates to nearly half of U.S. households, a huge increase over 
the six percent figure in 1980.19 This indirect type of stock ownership has 
characteristics that should heighten the concern about corporations spending 
general funds for electoral speech: stockholders likely will have neither access 
to information about the political spending of the corporations in which their 
money is indirectly invested nor the ability to sell the stock of a particular 
corporation if they disapprove. 
i i i .  inadequate relief for dissenting stockholders 
Even if dissenting stockholders surmounted information and collective 
action problems and did not face liquidity problems, they would still be left 
with few options for relief: sell the stock or pursue a derivative action. Neither 
of these options, however, gives dissenting stockholders prospective relief or a 
remedy that would put them in the position they would have been in had the 
corporate spending not occurred. Selling the stock avoids only future instances 
in which the corporation spends general funds on political speech that the 
stockholders oppose; it does nothing to address the political spending that 
already occurred.20 
A derivative action based on corporate political spending is also unlikely to 
provide relief. First, unless the dissenting stockholders can make a case for 
fraud or breach of the duty of loyalty for conduct like self-dealing, they are 
unlikely to pass the combination of hurdles necessary to succeed at trial. 
Stockholders would have to make a demand on the board or show futility, 
withstand a high bar at the motion to dismiss stage, and, assuming the case 
does not settle, overcome the highly deferential business judgment rule. This 
last obstacle could prove particularly difficult as the directors could potentially 
rationalize their conduct of making or overseeing political contributions as 
 
17.  See INV. CO. INST. & SEC. INDUS. ASS’N, EQUITY OWNERSHIP IN AMERICA, supra note 15, at 1-
2. 
18.  Id. at 1. 
19.  INV. CO. INST., 2009 INVESTMENT COMPANY FACT BOOK 72 (49th ed. 2009), available at 
http://www.ici.org/pdf/2009_factbook.pdf. 
20.  Justice Brennan correctly observed this point in Austin, noting: “Of course, a member could 
resign from the Chamber and a stockholder could divest from a business corporation that 
used the Chamber as a conduit, but these options would impose a financial sacrifice on 
those objecting to political expenditures.” Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 
652, 674 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
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being in the interest of the corporation or justified on another basis.21 Second, 
even if the dissenting stockholders were to succeed in a derivative action, they 
would not likely obtain meaningful recovery. Directors rarely pay damages out 
of their own pockets,22 and the corporation would not likely obtain 
reimbursement from the political candidate or organization that received the 
corporate donation. 
Procedures of corporate democracy such as a shareholder proposal likewise 
offer limited promise for dissenting stockholders. Corporations often seek to 
exclude shareholder proposals from their proxy statements and social 
responsibility-oriented shareholder proposals that do make it onto proxy 
statements rarely break the vote threshold needed to succeed.23 Even when 
shareholder proposals pass, they are generally not binding upon directors.24 
Other procedures of corporate democracy such as director elections also do 
not empower stockholders to control the corporation’s political spending. 
Stockholders’ implicit power to replace directors does not ensure that 
 
21.  See, for example, the well-known case Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1968), often cited for the proposition that a director could justify a decision made for 
noneconomic reasons by saying the decision was based on the long-term financial interest of 
the corporation. Charitable giving and constituency statutes could also potentially provide 
bases for justification. See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 763 (2005) (noting that every state has a statute giving managers 
authority to donate corporate money to charitable purposes and thirty states have corporate 
constituency statutes giving managers authority to consider nonshareholder interests, such 
as the interests of the community or society). 
22.  See Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. 
REV. 1055, 1063-64 (2006). 
23.  For information on when proposals must appear in proxy statements, see 17 C.F.R. § 
240.14a-8 (2008). See also Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case for Shareholder Access: A Response to 
the Business Roundtable, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 557, 564 (2005) (“[P]ast voting patterns 
clearly indicate that shareholder resolutions that are brought because of their appeal to 
shareholders with special interests generally do not pass. Shareholder resolutions that focus 
on social or labor issues generally fail.”); Adam J. Sulkowski & Kent Greenfield, A Bridle, a 
Prod, and a Big Stick: An Evaluation of Class Actions, Shareholder Proposals, and the Ultra Vires 
Doctrine as Methods for Controlling Corporate Behavior, 79 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 929, 943-45 
(2005) (noting that shareholder proposals “rarely receive more than a small percentage of 
the actual vote” and that “[e]ven shareholder activists acknowledge that shareholder 
proposals would not get anywhere if not for a coordinated public relations effort”). Notably, 
a few years ago three institutional investors failed to pass a shareholder proposal that called 
for board oversight and disclosure of soft money contributions. The proposal garnered only 
about ten percent of the vote at twelve of the twenty-three companies targeted. Dana Gold 
et al., Protecting the Polity: Strategies for Reform, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 991, 1005 (2007). 
24.  See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (2008); see also Sulkowski & Greenfield, supra note 23, at 943 
(noting that directors have discretion to consider and disregard shareholder proposals). 
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management will act in a certain desired way.25 Further, a proxy campaign to 
elect a slate of directors to carry out a preferred policy would involve significant 
expense and delay, during which time incumbent managers could continue 
corporate political spending without stockholder consent. Moreover, 
stockholders likely lack information on political spending and are diverse in 
their preferences. At best, in the context of large publicly-held corporations, the 
majority view would rule and some stockholders would have corporate funds 
used for political speech they oppose. 
iv.  new stockholder voluntariness issues in light of 
government bailouts 
Finally, as we are entering a world in which the federal government has 
become a large, even controlling, stockholder in some of the nation’s largest 
corporations, the possibility of overruling Austin and part of McConnell raises 
new questions. In the absence of strict restrictions and oversight on the use of 
the bailout money, taxpayer money in the form of government bailouts might 
be used by corporations for the reelection of politicians who treated the 
corporation or executives favorably. Taxpayers might have no direct recourse. 
This potential result may strike the public as particularly offensive because one 
set of agents—corporate management—would be in a position to spend other 
people’s money for electing another set of agents—political representatives—
who may be the same people who orchestrated bailouts in the first instance. 
conclusion 
As the Supreme Court reconsiders prior decisions upholding limits on 
corporate electioneering from general funds, this Essay suggests that the 
longstanding concern about the lack of stockholder assent to corporate political 
speech is more compelling than ever. Patterns of U.S. stockholding have 
significantly changed in the past several decades so as to heighten the concern 
and caution against a broad overruling of precedents. Stockholders’ ability to 
sell their securities or pursue a derivative action, and other means of corporate 
democracy, do not alleviate the concern. A broad decision in favor of Citizens 
United could leave even stockholders who carefully screen and monitor their 




25.  See Lucian Ayre Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 833, 
851-61 (2005). 
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